9-26-08, 9:17 am
Original source: l'Humanite
It is unanimously recognized that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating by the day. The engagement by NATO of over 70, 000 soldiers has offered no solution to the principal problems of terrorism, political instability, and the production and traffic of opium. But to believe that the foreign military presence alone is the reason for the deterioration of the situation since October 2001 – or to imagine that a military solution is possible for these problems – is to misunderstand the reality in Afghanistan.
An objective analysis of the situation shows the reasons for the failure of current strategy. The reality of the matter is complex, but there are three essential points:
First, the absence of a centralized state. The governing groups in Afghanistan all belong to factions of the Mujahedin. Each group has a certain amount of power over Afghan territory, and champions its own ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional interests. Objectively, it is not in the interests of these groups to facilitate the construction of a strong state that, being centralized and democratic, would deprive them of looting the country and the misappropriation of international aid funds.
Secondly, the Afghani army and police, which were broken up by Massoud in 1993, have been 'reconstructed' using the paramilitary troops of the Mujahedin. Having acquired no national character, these troops reproduce, and widen, the political, ethnic and linguistic divergences of the different factions of the Mujahedin. Infiltrated by the Taliban and the Pakistani and Iranian services, and equipped and financed by NATO, the army and the police are now potential sources of a new civil war in Afghanistan.
Finally, Pakistan’s interference is a crucial element. The weakening of Afghanistan is part of the Pakistani state’s political strategy, which all of Pakistan’s political parties have followed. The Taliban originate from the Pakistani army and form its “regional branch.” If there is no change in Pakistan’s policy, there will be no stability in Afghanistan or throughout the region. Some 40,000 Koranic schools give lodging, food, and a certain “education” to nearly two million students from the disadvantaged sections of the population. These schools form inexhaustible reserves for organizing and maintaining the “Taliban armies,” terrorist groups, and suicide bombers.
The problem in Afghanistan is essentially political and not military. The country needs another political force, constituted on a broad basis that is interethnic, democratic, and secular, and that must act as a “unifying and stabilizing political factor” in the formation of a centralized, strong, and democratic national state.
The elements for creating such a force already exist. Today there are more than 30 democratic and progressive political organizations in Afghanistan. The unfavorable conditions for emigration abroad and the repressive, vengeful policies of those in power in Kabul slow down the unification process of these organizations. Nevertheless, they are working to found a large democratic party that will become, along with the other non-jihadist democratic forces, the motor to create a wide democratic, interethnic, and secular movement.
On a national level, this movement will impose itself as the centralizing political force in power. It might evolve into a politico-military organization, the intermediate step in the creation of the armed forces, the pillar of the future Afghan state. The separation of the two components (political and military) will come about through the consolidation of democracy and the normalization of the functioning of government institutions.
The organization of such a movement essentially depends on the will of the international community. Tens of thousands of Afghani patriots, living in their country in miserable conditions or scattered around the world as political refugees, are ready to serve the Afghani people and this great project to reconstruct Afghanistan.
--Dr. Abdullah Naibi is president of the Movement for Afghanistan’s Future (Ayenda). This article originally appeared August 30, 2008. Translated by Sarah Zerner.