Bolton, Negroponte, and the OAS: Bush's Failed Latin American Policy

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4-14-05, 9:25 am



From Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Appalling nominations and the race for the OAS secretary-general post: Dramatic examples of the U.S.’s failed Latin American policy and the Bush administration’s disdain for international norms.



The Negroponte and Bolton Nominations

The Bush administration has nominated John Bolton and John Negroponte to be its ambassador to the United Nations and its
The Chess Game Continues: OAS Fails to Elect New Secretary-General
In an unexpected turn of events, the Organization of American States’ (OAS) General Assembly failed to elect a new secretary-general. The April 11 vote took place three days after the U.S.’ preferetti for the post, former El Salvadoran President Francisco Flores, surprisingly withdrew from the race. Flores had the backing of most Central American states and the U.S. but was considered the least viable choice among the three candidates, which also include Chile’s interior minister, José Miguel Insulza, and Mexico’s minister of foreign affairs, Ernesto Derbez.

After five rounds of votes at the OAS headquarters in downtown Washington, the member states failed to elect a new leader, with reports indicating that Derbez and Insulza each received 17 votes in all of the rounds (a candidate needs 18 out of the 34 possible votes to win). Due to the stalemate, the election has been postponed until May 2.

The OAS and Washington

The ongoing saga to elect an OAS leader has placed Washington in an uncomfortable position. This vote represents the first time that a U.S.-backed candidate will not be effortlessly elected to the position, which calls into question the exact nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the OAS for the following five years, particularly if the second string choice of the Bush administration – Derbez – is not awarded the post in May. The withdrawal of Flores, an ill-prepared political lightweight who was on the State Department’s list of dependent leaders who could be described as “U.S. clones,” must have been a hard hit for State Department hawks like Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega.

The question now is who would the U.S. like to see lead the OAS: Insulza, a strong-willed, if not arrogant, Chilean official who is a member of the Chilean Socialist party and opposed the U.S. war in Iraq, or Derbez, a relatively last-minute addition to the race who, in spite of his World Bank experience, does not appear to have the background or capacities to lead the hemispheric organization, much less the capacity to reform it. There are already rumors that a consensus candidate in the form of Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, Peru’s minister of foreign affairs, might emerge. Interestingly, Insulza, Derbez and for that matter, Rodriguez, are all politicians with aspirations to run for the presidency of their respective countries in upcoming elections. However, they are being “pushed aside” by their political mentors by being offered the OAS position as a “consolation prize.”

Washington is likely to step up its support of Derbez in an effort to improve relations with Mexico, its NAFTA partner, especially after the recent summit between Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin in Texas.

The OAS and Latin America

For decades, Latin American leaders have proclaimed the necessity to get out from under Washington’s all persuasive sphere of influence, using such hoary rhetoric of Latin American unity. However, when it comes to foot the bill, the U.S. covers over 60 percent of the OAS’ $84 million-budget. Where are the regional nationalists when it comes time to pay the OAS’ bills? There are few takers. If regional leaders are interested in moving Latin America away from the U.S.’ sphere of influence, then they should assume the responsibility of moving the OAS’ headquarters from downtown Washington to Caracas, Brasilia or Panama City.

In the end, the White House will have to realize that the OAS might actually take the step of relocating from Washington, both in symbolic as well as pragmatic terms. This may not be necessarily a bad idea. Should the OAS end up with a secretary-general not heavily influenced by the State Department, as has been the case since it was founded in 1948, good relations between the U.S. and the regional body would be a sign that Washington is willingto deal with the rest of the hemisphere as coequals. If, on the other hand, the U.S. continues to use its influence either in a gross or subtle manner on some small CARICOM nation like the Bahamas, Grenada or St. Kitts & Nevis (population 38,000) to change their vote to support a candidate of Washington’s preference, just like what happened in 1975 and 1994, then the OAS’ future will be limited. Perhaps the OAS could morph into a new body composed exclusively of Latin American nations, with the U.S. and Canada consigned to being observers – something like an expanded Rio group somewhat akin to the African Union. In any event, if the OAS is to function professionally and prove its worth, it must no longer be the embarrassment that it is now proving to be.



--Larry Birns is the director of COHA. Alex Sanchez is a research fellow at COHA.