8-13-08, 9:12 am

The Georgian military invasion of South Ossetia, a de facto autonomous region with its own government since the early 1990s, followed by the swift Russian counter-attack which drove out the Georgian forces, has provoked a lot of talk in the media but little clarity.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Ossetia has operated as an independent country, although it’s independence has not been formally recognized by the international community. A proponent of free-market neo-liberalism, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, a “charismatic” and successful New York lawyer who is staunchly pro-Western and fiercely anti-Russian, came to power in 2003 with the promise of forcing South Ossetia’s reunification with Georgia. South Ossetians have resisted Georgian rule, preferring to maintain their distinct ethnic identity and choosing to adopt Russian citizenship (approximately 95 percent of the population hold Russian passports). A 2006 referendum in South Ossetia saw nearly unanimous support for independence from Georgia.

The Bush administration, which has strongly promoted Georgia’s membership in NATO (a direct threat to Russia, on top of so-called Missile Shield) has flooded Georgia with armaments and trainers, and was even engaged in full-fledged military exercises with Georgia at the time of the invasion – which strikingly coincided with the opening of the Beijing Olympics. The US government and the corporate media immediately sided with Saakashvili and its military invasion of South Ossetia.

Though Saakashvili has been described as 'brash' and even 'autocratic,' with some observers questioning his mental capacity when he tried to rename a Georgian mountain after California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, it seems doubtful that he'd risk Washington's ire on a dangerous military operation without the Bush administration’s go ahead. The proverbial green light was almost certainly given – or at least fully expected.

One expert on the region hinted that Saakashvili's risky actions were likely to have been planned well in advance. 'It was a calculated gamble and he miscalculated. He has been forced to withdraw. It's a military blunder. It caused an international incident,' F. Stephen Larrabee, corporate chair of European security at the Rand Corporation in Washington, told the Los Angeles Times this week.

Georgia's Motives

Saakashvili's greater Georgian nationalism is not the only motive for his actions, however. Media reports relate that the South Ossetian government in 2006 sought and won Russian assistance for the construction of a gas pipeline, which would have competed with a separate pipeline already in existence and controlled by the Georgian government. When completed, the Ossetian pipeline would connect South Ossetia with Russia, easing Russian dependence on the Georgian government for some of its gas supplies, and this has been bitterly opposed by the Saakashvili government.

'Any kind of deal with the South Ossetian de facto authorities, without the Georgian central authorities' authorization, including participation of any foreign company in a tender of planned construction [of the gas pipeline], will be assessed as an infringement of Georgia's territorial integrity,' the Georgian Foreign Ministry said in 2006 after hearing reports of the deal with Russia.

Nevertheless, the 15 billion rouble pipeline project began in the summer of 2006. Both the Russians and the Ossetians saw the pipeline as an economic boon and a means of re-linking South Ossetia with North Ossetia in Russia.

Russian Motives

Russian military forces, numbered in the hundreds, have been stationed in South Ossetia as part of a peacekeeping arrangement with Georgia that was sanctioned by international organizations since 1992. Once the Aug. 8th invasion of South Ossetia by Georgian forces began, Russia, after first appealing to an emergency session of the UN Security Council calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, intervened with overwhelming military force to repel the invasion. After a few days of fighting, the Russians reclaimed complete control of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, which, media reports say, had been almost totally destroyed by Georgian forces, including thousands of military casualties. South Ossetian forces reported large numbers of civilian casualties caused by the Georgian forces.

After the counter-attack began, Russian ultranationalist parties released numerous statements expressing nationalistic support for the Ossetian cause, dangerously calling on the Putin-Medvedev government to use 'tactical nuclear weapons' against Georgian forces. Even the largest opposition party in the Russian parliament, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, expressed support for Russia's military counter-offensive. The Russians took the opportunity to inflict massive military casualties on the Georgian, some of which may have occurred after a a cease-fire had been called, according to some media accounts.

What is motivating Russia? Russia strongly opposes Georgia's entry into NATO and is seeking to reassert influence over its southern neighbors. Russia lost dominance there following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Increased US intervention in the region, signaled by a massive influx of military aid to Georgia, and other former Soviet Republics (and other regional powers like Turkey and Israel), wooed many to lean toward the US, to Russia's chagrin. In addition, Russia has watched as the size of the US military presence in the region has grown with the nearly simultaneous invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the permanent occupation-style military bases in Kuwait and other countries in the region.

Accusations Fly

Speaking at the United Nations on Aug. 11th, US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad described the Russian military action in South Ossetia as a 'continuing aggression against the sovereign state of Georgia.' Khalilzad demanded to know whether the Russians intended to 'overthrow' the Georgian government. He further accused the Russians of intensifying their attacks and expanding their military actions. Ironically, Khalilzad also appealed to the UN Security Council, calling on it to 'encourage Russia to cease hostilities.'

Speaking at a UN press conference, Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin referred to Georgia's actions in South Ossetia as an 'invasion.' Russian President Dmitri Medvedev characterized the Saakashvili government as the 'aggressor.' Putin himself tartly responded to Bush administration statements about Russia's intention to cause regime change by saying that “the use of military force to cause regime change was an American invention.'

Georgia offered to withdraw from South Ossetia and return to the way things were before, along with its weak claim to control of South Ossetia, on the condition of an immediate secession of hostility and respect for its sovereignty. While making this dubious offer, Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania accused the Russian government of “relaunching the Cold War.' He also accused it of lying to the international community and of physically targeting Saakashvili. Alasania, also ironically, asked the UN Security Council to act in support of a French resolution calling for immediate ceasefire.

Russian Ambassador Churkin responded to the Georgian government's charges by suggesting that Georgia's peaceful intentions were doubtful. Russia put forward two basic preconditions for its withdrawal: 1) the Georgia government must withdraw from South Ossetia, 2) Georgia must guarantee the security and safety of South Ossetians and agree to the 'non-use of force.'

Churkin indicated that Georgia's refusal to move on these points is what had blocked progress on the issue of a ceasefire. Up to that point, Georgia had not ceased military activity in South Ossetia and even admitted to building up military forces ready to reenter the region. The Russian ambassador also accused the US of providing air transport to bring the 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq back home, ostensibly to defend Tblisi.

As of Aug. 12th, a shaky ceasefire appeared to have been finally reached.

Sorting It Out

It is clear that Bush administration and Georgian claims that the Russians were the aggressors in this instance were grossly overstated. It is probable that Georgia acted with the Bush administration’s consent. Georgia would like to either control or end the Ossetian gas pipeline project and limit Russian influence in territory it lost a claim on some 16 years ago. The Bush administration wants to maintain its weighty influence in this strategically sensitive region, so that it can limit Russia's access to energy sources, as well as project US military power for future actions.

Attempts to link Russia's actions in this case to past Soviet military intervention also fall flat and ring hypocritical. US military and political intervention globally throughout the Cold War period – a practice it was far more adept at and habitually prone to than the Soviets – was marred by a drive for increasing the size of its sphere of influence and crushing often democratically elected opposition. If there is any adequate comparison between Russia's actions now and the past, it is with US government actions in Latin American, the Middle East, Africa, and East and Southeast Asia from the 1950s through the 1990s.*

Also, the Bush administration's well-known fabrication of its case for war in Iraq flies in the face of its current pretense at peace-making and the moral high ground.

On the other hand, while Russia's claim to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia who have sought independence from Georgia has some legitimacy, it is also clear that its actions are equally motivated by geo-strategic interests and re-gaining control over the natural resources of neighboring countries and not simply altruism. Notably, Russia has sought to promote and provoke ethnic-based conflicts, not unlike the US government, in the former Soviet Republics to find leverage to regain influence over those countries.

The events in South Ossetia help reveal how inter-imperialist rivalries combine to cause war and humanitarian crises. The world has already often seen such small, localized conflicts over resources and power erupting into major global war. We do not need it to happen again, especially with the large size of the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the US still in existence.

A ceasefire on all three sides is the best path to restoring peace. South Ossetia's self-determination, based on the will of its people, should be respected. All parties involved should back ceasefire efforts, immediately call for UN administered and sponsored trilateral talks to discuss and work out the best means of guaranteeing territorial sovereignty, economic cooperation, and security for all three powers.

Above all, the Bush administration should drop its pretense at being a neutral observer and end its meddlesome interference in the internal affairs of South Ossetia, Georgia, and Russia.

It is clear that despite the bluster and strongly worded statements, more than five years of failed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has put the Bush administration in a position, politically, militarily and ethically, where it is completely incapable of backing up its sharp verbal attacks and dubious claims. Indeed, the Bush administration’s claim that Russia is using its military power to impose regime change on Georgia is the height of hypocrisy and laughable at best.

John McCain's Big Mouth

John McCain's own intervention in the conflict with the claim that 'we are all Georgians,' is equally laughable and saturated with hypocrisy. A recent Wall Street Journal expose on Randy Scheunemann, a former lobbyist registered as a foreign agent of the Georgian government, is a top McCain campaign staffer and foreign policy adviser, and his company just signed a new contract with Georgia for $200,000. McCain's inauthentic comment is little more than a reflection of his ties to Washington lobbyists seeking to influence US foreign policy on behalf of foreign governments.

*Recall Korea 1951, Iran 1953, Guatemala 1956, Congo 1961, Indonesia 1965, Ghana 1966, Vietnam, 1954 through 1975, Chile 1973, El Salvador 1981, Lebanon 1982-1983, Grenada, 1983, Nicaragua throughout the 1980s, Panama, 1988, Iraq 1991 to name a few.

--Joel Wendland, Peter Zerner, and Norman Markowitz contributed to the research and reporting for this article.