Editors note: PA science editor Prasad Venugopal interviewed members of the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal last April. Bhopal, India is the site of one of the worst industrial disasters in history. Over 18 years later the people of Bhopal are still demanding justice. Venugopal spoke with Krishnaveni Gundu and Nityanand Jayaraman. Krishnaveni is the US coordinator for the International Campaign for Justice for Bhopal and has been involved since 1999 when she first volunteered in a free clinic for the gas victims. Nityanand is an India-based independent journalist who has been associated with the Bhopal campaign since 1994. Readers can find out more at the ICJB website: .

PA: Can you give a little background on the Bhopal disaster?

ICJB: The night of December 2, and in the early morning of December 3, 1984, about 40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) and other lethal gases leaked from Union Carbide’s pesticides factory in the city of Bhopal, which is in Madhya Pradesh, a central state in India. In the immediate aftermath, in less than three days, it killed about 8,000 people and that’s an extremely rough estimate. The citizens of Bhopal estimate up to 10,000 died; official figures have never gone beyond 3,000 dead. Because of the aftereffects of exposure, about 20,000 people have died to date.

PA: There are reports that even today there are still people dying.

ICJB: We estimate 10 to 15 deaths every month because of the lasting effects of exposure. There are intergenerational effects amongst children of the people who were exposed. Some are being born with birth defects. They’re born with smaller heads, smaller limbs, respiratory disorders, attention deficits and growth disorders. They have serious health problems. These children can’t play; they play for 10 minutes, they’re tired, and have to sit down in order not to compromise their health. If you hear them breathing, it is almost as if they’ve run a marathon.
PA: What is the background to the legal case?

ICJB: After the disaster, cases filed in the US, were dismissed. In India, the people started filing cases against the company and there were a large number of individual suits. The government decided to argue the case on their behalf. There's no such thing as a class action suit in India. The government appointed itself as the sole representative of the vicitms and then passed a law preventing any Indian citizen from filing a lawsuit against Union Carbide or any of its officials. But in so doing, what they also did was rob the people of representation. While the case was being heard in the [Indian] Supreme Court, the government of India, in closed-door negotiation with Union Carbide, was offered a settlement of $470 million.

PA: How far did it go in the US? Was it just thrown out?

ICJB: Yes, it was thrown out of district court in New York. What they originally demanded was based on a figure that was far lower than what they actually expected the damages to be. Union Carbide was overjoyed. At this time, they negotiated with the India government that all criminal liability be dropped.

PA: Including for Warren Anderson?

ICJB: Warren Anderson, Union Carbide Corporation, Union Carbide Eastern and nine other individuals, who were primarily officials of Union Carbide of India, are named in the criminal case for culpable homicide, among other counts. They wanted the charges dropped so they offered $470 million. The government of India granted their wishes in 1989. There was a huge uproar from survivors. The Supreme Court said, “The settlement has been done, but you have no right to grant immunity.” So the criminal case was reinstated in a year’s time, and the charges were reinstated. Once the criminal case was reinstated, the Bhopal judge called for Warren Anderson. They published a legal notice in the Washington Post. The guy does not appear. Union Carbide disappeared. So in 1991 they were declared fugitives. The courts attached the assets of Union Carbide Corporation to ensure that the company would appear in court. Subsequently, the Union Carbide asked the Supreme Court for relief. They said something like, If you’d like to build a hospital, it will be much more beautiful, if you allow us to sell our shares. Justice Ahmadi allowed them to do so despite the fact that it was against the law, and three years later he became chairman of the Bhopal Hospital Trust. Union Carbide has written off that money, because it’s easy to write off when you’ve got liabilities that might be 10 times higher.

PA: And the status of the US legal case? Initially, a report, actually commissioned by Carbide, claimed that there was no contamination. As part of the discovery in the New York class-action lawsuit, in September and October of 2002, we discovered Carbide’s own consultant had actually not stood by the report. In some cases, the data is insufficient and in some cases faulty. They strongly suggested that it not go in the court’s record. This is something that was not known and is one of the strongest pieces of evidence of Carbide having complete knowledge of what was happening. They knew at one point that the ground water supply had been contaminated. They knew at one point that their solar evaporation ponds where they dumped the toxic waste had started leaking. There is documentation of communication back and forth between various officials in departments saying, “It’s leaking. What do we do now?” And suddenly they just stopped all of their internal studies. All of this documentation is up on our website, .

The other interesting thing we found out as a part of the discovery was the fact that the technology sent to Bhopal to control MIC poison gasses was untested and unproven. Carbide had to save money. It’s very interesting why they wanted to do it quickly because until that point they did not need to manufacture MIC in India. In the early 1970s, the Indian government passed the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act preventing foreign companies from owning more than 50 percent equity in any industry. So Carbide [US] had 50.9 percent equity in Carbide [India]. Now they wanted to maintain majority stake. But with this new regulation they were not going to be able to do that, unless they could find some means of “back integrating.” Therefore, instead of importing MIC gases, they wanted to manufacture it in Bhopal itself. And they wanted to do it quickly before the act was in place, so they could subvert it. That’s why this happened.

A document with Warren Anderson’s name among others on it says something to the effect that they were aware of the risks that they were taking by sending untested technology, but they had to do it in order to maintain control.

PA: It’s been said that the disaster also occurred because of cost-cutting done just prior to it.

ICJB: Absolutely. In 1982, Carbide’s own internal safety audit report shows there were 61 hazards in the factory. Eleven of them were serious and within the MIC unit. There was a series of leaks and accidents. In fact, there were reporters in Bhopal saying, “We’re sitting on a time bomb.” At the time of the disaster, they had shut down the refrigeration unit that is critical for the storage of MIC in order to save approximately $40 a day. This proved extremely critical in escalating the disaster. Safety personnel were laid off to save money. PA: Was the plant unionized? How has the Indian labor movement responded to this attack on workers’ lives and rights?

ICJB: Union Carbide factory workers were organized in a Carbide factory workers union. I think they were affiliated with the Center for Indian Trade Unions, that’s a Communist Party (Marxist) trade union. The first organized reaction was undertaken by the trade unions. They came down immediately in terms of relief work and stayed on. Even before the disaster happened, these people had raised a number of safety issues. People had been injured and killed in the past. Virtually every revelation about how the factory was poorly designed, how the people were not properly equipped and how, despite warnings by the workers themselves, the management did not pay heed to any of these things, was all brought out by workers. CBI’s entire case was built on testimonies by the workers because they knew the plant inside and out. One ex-Carbide factory worker, a supervisor there, was the one who provided most of the information about Carbide’s lies. Even internationally there is a lot of solidarity. Support on the Bhopal issue has been solid, even if it has not been very fruitful.

PA: Solid in terms of…?

ICJB: In terms of solidarity. Initiative has been taken primarily by the local people, the women’s trade union organizations.

PA: Can you talk more about the women’s trade unions?

ICJB: The group is called Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Stationery Karmachari Sangh (BGPMSKS), which means Bhopal Gas Affected Women’s Stationery Association. This is a trade union that initially began with 100 people. As part of the rehabilitation efforts, the government opened about 40 training centers in Bhopal. These workshops were set up to train local women [survivors of the disaster] in various skills, so they can be absorbed in mainstream life and can make a living. Of the 40, only one, the BGPMSKS, remained open because they filed a lawsuit against the government. Everything else was shut down after the training period, because the government said, “We’ve done our job. Training over. Go back home.” Realizing their rights, the Women's Stationery Center Organized themselves into BGPMSKS while the other centers were being shut down. Of the three organizations, one of them was the Women’s Stationery Workers Union of 100 women. When the state government threatened to close down the stationery factory, these women fought and kept it open. But they continued to work on a piece rate, not regular wages.

The other demand has been that other shops should be opened because that’s the obligation of the government to the survivors. The case was eventually heard in labor court, which grnated the survivors victory in Decemebr 2002. The court basically said, “You have to give them back pay from 1998 and you have to regularize them.” The state government is appealing the decision.

PA: What groups have been approached in the US?

ICJB: Approaching labor groups is a more recent strategy, but in these past 18 years there have been groups like Environmental Health Fund, the Ecology Center, Corpwatch, Pesticides Action Network (North America and UK) and the Center for Health and Environment. The initial alliance from day one has been international. It has tended to bring other similar disaster-impacted communities together, such as Minamata, Seveso and Chernobyl. All the initial victories and pressure put on the government of India and on Union Carbide, in the first 10 years, have been from this global coalition. What is happening now is more systematic outreach. The US is a place where the pressure needs to be built because it is where the headquarters of the corporations are. There’s been an effort to enlighten and recruit the support of the Indian community. Pollution-impacted communities and labor groups are being approached as well. PA: So this is the other side of globalization, global solidarity?

ICJB: It’s globalizing solidarity and resistance also. Common people and students are very important to the campaign. They’ve been very receptive, both Indian students and American students. At the University of Michigan, they [Michigan Student Assembly] passed a resolution [in March 2003] asking the university to divest from Dow. Dow is the biggest funder to that university. This is a historic resolution, saying that if the university does not take a stand against Dow, (Union Carbide is now a subsidiary of Dow), it will be complicit in the crimes at Bhopal. That has really got people worried because until now no one has tried to force the university to take a stand.