Bush and the Downing Street Memo

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6-12-05, 7:58 am



An internal memo from British Prime Minister Tony Blair foreign policy aide Matthew Rycroft detailing a meeting between Prime Minister Tony Blair, his top security advisors, and his Attorney General was leaked in early May and published in the British press. This memo makes a number of assertions about the events leading up to war in Iraq that dispute statements made by President Bush and members of the Administration, including statements on Iraq’s pre-war WMD capacity, whether the U.S. had a plan for post-war Iraq, and whether the timeline for going to war was politicized.

This week, President Bush dismissed the memo as a political dirty trick designed to derail Prime Minister Blair’s reelection campaign. RNC Chairman Ken Mehlman said that the memo 'has been discredited by everyone else who has looked at it.' And White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan recently dismissed the contents of this memo as 'flat out wrong.' But on issue after issue - from the criteria for the use of military force to the role of the UN to the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capacity - the facts in the Downing Street memo have been borne out by reality.
MILITARY FORCE WAS THE LAST OPTION?

BRITISH MEMO CLAIM: Timeline Was To Begin '30 Days Before the US Congressional Elections.' The British memo states: 'The Defense Secretary said that the US had already begun ‘spikes of activity’ to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.' [British memo, Sunday Times (London), 5/1/05]

BUSH CLAIM: Bush Claimed He Went To War Because He Was Forced To. 'Both of us didn’t want to use our military. Nobody wants to commit military into combat. It’s the last option. The consequences of committing the military are very difficult. You know, one of the hardest things I do as the president is try to comfort families who have lost a loved one in combat. It’s the last option that the president must have.' [Press Conference, 6/6/05]

THE FACTS: Timeline of Iraq War Did Indeed Begin A Month Prior To 2002 Congressional Elections. The President praised the House passage of the Iraq war resolution on October 10th, 2002 and the Senate passage of the Iraq war resolution on October 11th, 2002. He signed the Iraq war resolution on October 16th, 2002. Congressional elections were held on November 5th, 2002. [www.whitehouse.gov, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021011.html, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021010-5.html]

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

BRITISH MEMO CLAIM: British Memo Stated That Bush Administration Had 'No Patience' For UN. 'The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.' [British memo, Sunday Times (London), 5/1/05]

BUSH CLAIM: Use of Force Was Dependent on UN Approval. '... [W]e worked hard to see if we could figure out how to do this peacefully. Put a united front up to Saddam Hussein to say the world speaks and he ignored the world. Remember, 1441 passed the Security Council unanimously.' [Press Conference, 6/6/05]

THE FACTS: Bush and Cheney Made It Plain that UN Was Irrelevant. President Bush made plain yesterday that the United States is willing to take Iraq on alone if the United Nations fails to 'show some backbone' by confronting Saddam Hussein. He added: 'Make no mistake about it. If we have to deal with the problem, we’ll deal with it.' Vice President Dick Cheney echoed Bush. '[This is] such an important issue and such an important problem that we will address [it] by ourselves if we have to.' [York Sunday News, 9/15/02]

THE FACTS WEREN’T FIXED? MANIPULATION OF PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

BRITISH MEMO CLAIM: Intelligence and Facts Were 'Fixed Around the Policy.' The British memo stated there had been a 'perceptible shift in attitude. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy.' [LAT, 5/12/05]

BUSH CLAIM: In March 2003, Bush Claimed He Had Not Made Decision To Go to War. 'Well, we’re still in the final stages of diplomacy... The only thing I can do is assure the loved ones of those who wear our uniform that if we have to go to war, if war is upon us because Saddam Hussein has made that choice... I hope we don’t have to go to war. But if we go to war we will disarm Iraq.' [Bush, 3/6/03]

THE FACTS: Intelligence Community Analysts Detail Environment of Intense Pressure. The CIA’s independent review on U.S. intelligence on Iraq concluded that 'Requests for reporting and analysis of [Iraq’s links to al Qaeda] were steady and heavy in the period leading up to the war, creating significant pressure on the Intelligence Community to find evidence that supported a connection.' The CIA Ombudsman concurred with this conclusion, stating to members of the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence that '...’the hammering’ was harder than any he had previously witnessed...several analysts he spoke with mentioned pressure.' [Kerr Report, July 2003; Additional Views, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence on Iraq, 9/7/04]



--Read the Downing Street Memo here.