6-03-05,8:35am
From People’s Democracy
THE first Asian-African conference was organised fifty years ago at Bandung, Indonesia, from April 18 to 24, 1955. The conference was sponsored by Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan. It was attended by 18 other countries from Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Peoples Republic of China, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Syria, Thailand, Turkey and Yemen) and 6 countries from Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast [now Ghana], Liberia, Libya and Sudan). The holding of the Conference was necessitated by various post-war issues and events that were confronting the newly decolonised and liberated nations of Asia and Africa. Although World War II ended in August 1945, it did not ensure peace and security in the world since hostility between two groups of nations – one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union – continued in different ways. Moreover, several regions of Asia and Africa were still colonised by Western countries. Attempts to quell anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles led to open wars in the Malayan Peninsula, Korean Peninsula , Indochina, Palestine, and in many parts of Africa. ROLE OF NEHRU
One of those who were in the forefront of the struggle against colonial oppression was India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was not only the architect of India's non-aligned foreign policy but also played a major role in espousing the cause of the third-world countries. In the prevailing turbulent state of global affairs, charting a non-aligned foreign policy posed a big challenge and it was only due to the wisdom and skill of Nehru that he succeeded in doing so. The principles guiding the foreign policy of India 's interim government that was formed just prior to gaining independence was enunciated by Nehru on September 7, 1946. In a radio address, Nehru, who then headed the interim government, stated that India would not join groups of states that were aligned against each other but would strive to establish friendly relations with all countries. Nehru had already conceived of a closer association of the Asian countries for evolving a common foreign policy. During his visit to South-East Asian countries in March 1946, Nehru not only secured the support for his idea but also got the needed consent from leaders of Burma, Indonesia and so on for holding a conference for that purpose. The Asian Relations Conference was held in Delhi at a non-governmental level under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs from March 23 to April 02, 1947. It was attended by delegations from 28 countries including some of the Asian republics of the then Soviet Union. Observers came from the United Nations, the Arab League, and from institutes of international relations of Australia, Britain, USA and USSR. The conference helped strengthen the solidarity of Asian nations and was a predecessor of the Bandung Conference. However, when independence came on August 15, 1947, urgent internal problems such as ending communal clashes, the resettlement of refugees, etc, pushed everything else into the background. Later, developments in Kashmir compounded these problems. CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA The independent character of the Indian foreign policy was first demonstrated with the convening in Delhi from January 20 to 23, 1949 of the International Conference on Indonesia. Holland's attempt at restoring colonial rule in Indonesia by armed force on the night of December 19, 1948 sent alarming signals across the newly decolonised countries about the possible threats of re-colonisation. Jogjakarta, the Indonesian capital was seized by Dutch paratroopers and president Sukarno, prime minister Mohammed Hatta, and other members of the Indonesian government were arrested and interned on an isolated island. Nehru, who sharply denounced Holland's action, which he described as naked and brazen aggression, decided to close all Indian seaports and airports to Dutch vessels and aircraft. Then responding to the Burmese prime minister U Nu's proposal of holding a conference of Asian states in defence of Indonesia, Nehru decided to organise an International Conference. It was attended by 19 countries including Australia and New Zealand. Ruling circles in the United States and Britain, who tacitly supported the Dutch aggression, were displeased at the holding of the conference and, therefore, exerted pressure to influence the outcome of the conference. Yet, the Conference condemned the Dutch aggression and demanded the immediate release of the arrested members of the Indonesian government, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Jogjakarta and transfer of power to the United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950. Consequently, hostilities ended on May 7, 1949 and an agreement was signed to hold further negotiations at a round table conference under the auspices of the United Nations. NEHRU REFUSES TO BUCKLE Another development that had important bearing on shaping India 's foreign policy was Nehru's visit to the United States in October 1949. The US Administration had timed the trip in such a way that it coincided with the ascendance of the Communist Party to power in China. During the visit, considerable pressure was exerted by the United States on Nehru to draw India into the anti-communist camp. However, Nehru spurned all such insidious attempts by summarily rejecting the US proposal of setting up military bases in India in return for the economic aid that Nehru had gone there to seek. Failure to obtain US economic aid without political strings and because of the general foreign policy of the United States of suppressing national liberation movements in Asia, relations between India and the United States began to sour. Concurrently, relation with the new regime in China was an important foreign policy problem that India had to tackle and it did so by recognising the Peoples Republic of China on December 30, 1949. India also supported the demand for granting China its rightful place in the UN Security Council instead of the Chiang Kai-shek regime of Taiwan, which was being backed by the United States. Although the 'Tibetan Question' briefly cast a shadow over Indo-China relations in 1950, relations between the two began to improve after the signing on January 1, 1951 of the barter agreement on supplying India, which was suffering from food shortage at that time, with Chinese rice in exchange for Indian jute. KOREAN WAR AND AFTER
The evolution of India's foreign policy was also influenced by the developments during the Korean War, which started on June 25, 1950. While India initially supported the UN Security Council resolution that enabled the US to intervene in the Korean War under the flag of the United Nations, India refused to give any military support and only sent a medical team on a humanitarian mission. India made it clear that its aim was to localise the conflict and to help find a speedy solution to the Korean problem. On September 30, 1950, Nehru cautioned the 'UN forces' that was approaching the 38th Parallel not to cross it especially since China had forewarned that in such an eventuality it would be forced to intervene on the side of North Korea in the war. However, the US disregarded Nehru's advice and in early October 1950, the US invaded North Korea, thereby, forcing China to enter the war. Subsequently, India voted against a UN resolution dated January 30, 1951 that tried to declare the Peoples Republic of China an aggressor in the Korean War. Eventually, India went on to play a significant role in ending the Korean War on July 27, 1953 and also headed the neutral-nations commission for repatriation of prisoners of war. Meanwhile, India had refused to attend the San Francisco Conference convened by the United States on September 8, 1951 to sign the peace treaty with Japan, because of the US position that the provisions of the treaty were non-negotiable. The Soviet Union and those allied with it also refused to become parties to the said treaty mainly on two counts: (1) that there was no clause in the treaty opposing the revival of militarism in Japan; and (2) that the treaty permitted the stationing of US troops on Japanese territory. Later, India signed a separate peace treaty with Japan on June 9, 1952 to formally end hostilities, while keeping the controversial issues in abeyance. GENEVA ACCORD
Forced to stop its hostilities in Korea in July 1953, the US did everything to prevent France's defeat in the colonial war in Indo-China that had been going on for more than seven years. The US readily shouldered more than 76 per cent of the expenses of the war and also contemplated use of atomic weapons. Instead of remaining a passive onlooker, Nehru issued an appeal on February 22, 1954 for an immediate ceasefire, which contributed to the convening of the Geneva Conference of all interested parties to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indo-China issues. Moreover, on April 26, 1954, just two days before the scheduled conference was to open in Geneva, Nehru put forward a six-point programme for the establishment of peace in Indo-China. It envisaged an immediate ceasefire; an undertaking by France to grant the countries of Indo-China independence; a guarantee by the big powers not to interfere in the affairs of these countries; etc. Thus, India stepped in to make a notable contribution in bringing about ceasefire in the Indo-China war on July 21, 1954, although India was present only in an unofficial capacity at the Geneva talks. India later chaired the three-member international commission – the other two being Canada and Poland – that was set-up to monitor the ceasefire.
The stepping up of US imperialist policy in Asia on the whole and the US decision to provide military aid to Pakistan in particular, were other important factors that influenced the shaping of India's foreign policy towards positive neutrality. At the end of December 1953, referring to the proposed US military aid to Pakistan in return for setting up US military bases there, Nehru not only sharply criticised the proposal but also categorically stated that 'India would not allow foreign troops on her soil under any circumstances and any pretext.' ('The Hindu, Madras, January 2, 1954) NO TO US MEDDLING
Subsequently, on February 24, 1954, when US president Eisenhower in a letter formally informed Nehru of the decision of the US to grant military aid to Pakistan, Eisenhower also expressed his desire to provide military aid to India. However, Nehru, in a speech in the Indian parliament on March 1, 1954, firmly rejected the US offer and instead demanded the removal of the US military observers from the UN team stationed in Kashmir. According to Nehru, 'These American observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute and hence their presence there appears to us to be improper.' (Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 1954, Vol. I, No.12, Part II, Col. 971) Nehru no doubt was well aware of the mischief that the US undercover agents were perpetrating in Kashmir. On April 2, 1954, Nehru also became the first head of government to give a clarion call for an immediate stand-still agreement on nuclear weapon testing. His call was in response to the growing menace of radioactive fallout from such tests, which was exemplified by the 15-megaton atmospheric test conducted by the US on March 1, 1954 at Bikini Atoll. Other leaders of the newly independent Asian countries too felt the need for joint action to tackle the numerous concerns of the region. In order to discuss them the then Prime Minister of Ceylon, John Kotelawala, took the initiative in holding an informal meeting at Colombo from April 29 to May 2, 1954 to which prime ministers of Burma (U Nu), India (Jawaharlal Nehru), Indonesia (Ali Sastroamidjojo), and Pakistan (Mohammed Ali) were invited. It was here that the decision was taken to support the Indonesian prime minister's proposal to hold a conference of Asian and African countries.
