The truth about the December Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the January 7-8 U.S. air strikes on the Somalian towns of Afmadow and Ras Kamboni is obscure to most Americans. This makes it easy for the Bush administration to hide its actual intentions behind its ill-defined, illegal, and failing policy known as 'the global war on terror.' As usual, the bulk of the U.S. media have followed along, focusing their attention on the U.S. air strikes which failed to kill the targeted individuals (who may or may not have ties to Al-Qaeda and who may or may not have even been there), while callously downplaying or ignoring the deaths of as many as 70 non-combatants in the air strikes.

What aren't we being told about the Somalia invasion and the real goals of the U.S. and Ethiopia that motivated these attacks?

For many Americans, talk of Somalia will recall the horrific scenes of U.S. service members being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993, an event which forced President Clinton to order a hasty retreat. During that period, U.S. forces were attempting to kidnap Somali clan warlord and former U.S. Marine Mohammad Farah Aidid. Unfortunately this was neither the beginning nor the end of U.S. intervention in Somalia and the region.

From Liberation to Disintegration

Somalia, a largely homogeneous country religiously and linguistically, was artificially created by imperialist forces at the close of the colonial era in the mid-20th century. The boundaries established in 1960 reflected the interests of Britain (which controlled what is now Somalia), formerly fascist Italy (which had controlled neighboring Ethiopia and had incorporated a large swath of Somali land), and France (which had colonized Djibouti to the north). Because these boundaries reflected imperial economic interests and divided the local populations, they could not represent the cultural or nationalist sentiments in the region.

By the late 1960s and 1970s, Somalia was caught in a cycle of violence with neighboring Ethiopia related to land claims and border disputes inherited from the colonial era. By the mid-1970s, progressive political forces in Ethiopia had risen to power and aligned that country with the USSR. Ethiopia received military and economic aid from socialist countries like Cuba, Vietnam, and Yemen until the Ethiopian government, led by the Workers' Party, fell in 1991 to U.S.-backed militias.

During this same period of time, Somalia wavered between internal forces that favored non-alignment in the Cold War, national liberation, and peace with Ethiopia and those forces that opted for fealty to the U.S. and Western interests. Originally founded as a socialist-oriented government aimed at transforming the economy and eliminating clan divisions, by the late 1970s, the Siad Barre regime had aligned itself with the U.S. and, in exchange for use of the Berbera naval base on the Gulf of Aden, received massive financial and military aid.

Alliance with the U.S. ended Somalia's goal of socialist transformation, as a new obsessive focus on Somali nationalism masked a resurgent clan-based division of power. Another devastating consequence of this decision to align itself with the U.S. was the transformation of Somalia's economy from one of multi-sectoral development to being primarily driven by the export of labor. By the late 1980s, analysts believed that about 40% of the country’s GDP was based on remittances from Somali workers in other countries. The export of livestock and cash crops was also significant, but manufacturing, which had constituted about 20% of Somali exports in the mid-1970s, as well as mining, were allowed to decline.

Since it was based on the ideology and policies of neoliberalism, this 'structural adjustment' earned Somalia special attention from the World Bank and the IMF. By 1984, the Mogadishu regime was underwritten by the U.S. to the tune of $34 million, plus tons of international food aid, and millions from international financial institutions. This new alliance with the U.S. fostered corruption, severe repression of the political opposition, and an ultra-nationalism bent on re-incorporating all Somali people, including eastern Ethiopia. This ultra-nationalism perpetuated violence with Ethiopia and created a dependency on U.S. military aid, but it did help to temporarily distract from Somalia's internal problems. From a country able to adequately feed its population, by 1991 Somalia had become one of the poorest and hungriest countries in the entire world. It is from this period that Somalia's decomposition can be dated.

With the onset of drought and widespread famine in 1991 and growing armed opposition to Barre's brutality, the economy and all unifying central political authority collapsed. It was future Bush-Clinton nemesis and former cold warrior Aidid who led the militias that finally defeated Barre in 1992. This political and economic collapse allowed the rise of competing clan interests, civil war, and a power vacuum in which Aidid continued to play a leading role. Somali clans under current conditions are large extended-family networks in which personal loyalties have a stronger pull than national or class identity. As a result, led by local clan alliances, northern portions of the country seceded and formed a state called Somaliland.

For its part, the U.S. under George H.W. Bush sought to maintain its influence and military presence in Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia by militarily intervening in Somalia's internal affairs under the guise of humanitarian aid. President Clinton followed this policy, but the atrocities in October 1993 forced the above-mentioned withdrawal. Instead, a large U.S. military base was established in Somalia's northern neighbor Djibouti.

In Somalia, clan warfare quickly broke out and the country was labeled a 'failed state.' UN peacekeeping forces also retreated by 1995. Aidid declared himself a unifier of the clans and president of Somalia, but he was assassinated within a year. Competing forces continued to fight for control of the country's different regions until the 2004 Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with strong influence from Ethiopia and the U.S., was established in an attempt to restore political unity.

The TFG was (and still is) headed by Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi and President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, both of whom either led or participated in the clan militias that ousted Barre. However, local forces continued to hold sway in terms of the day-to-day exercise of power, and fought other clan militias for control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia under the aegis of the CIA-funded Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which served as an armed force in support of the TFG. The ARPCT was an alliance of various clan and business interests whose leaders served as current or former ministers in the TFG. Some have ties to Ethiopian intelligence agencies and some even led the clan militias that fought U.S. and UN peacekeeping forces in the early 1990s.

Despite its inability to control Mogadishu or most of southern Somalia, this weak and politically unstable arrangement was internationally recognized as the government of Somalia. The TFG's weakness allowed competing clan interests to thrive, along with all the attendant violence, assassinations, kidnappings, roadblocks, corruption, and generalized gangsterism. No form of civil society could develop in such an environment.

By mid-2006, when it rose to prominence, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), by no means a politically progressive or democratic entity, provided the basis for a unifying alternative to the weak TFG system, Ethiopian and U.S. influence, and persistent clan warfare. ICU militias briefly fought the TFG militias, the latter aided by Ethiopia and the U.S., but a tenuous peace was created when both sides signed a power-sharing agreement during negotiations overseen by the Arab League in July 2006.

The main role of the Islamic Courts Union after the July agreement was to create a space in which competing clan interests could be resolved in a peaceful way by providing an alternative to the instability of the TFG and violent clan rule, so that schools could reopen and public safety be restored. Thus, there does seem to be popular support for the ICU, in contrast to the hostility felt for the presence of Ethiopian and U.S. troops.

Bush administration claims that the ICU might be an Al-Qaeda operation or at least 'an Al-Qaeda safe-haven' have not been substantiated. According to the BBC, the only such link might be that one ICU leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, formerly headed an Al-Qaeda-tied organization that no longer exists. Claims that the ICU protected individuals believed to have been involved in the Al-Qaeda bombings of the U.S.T in Nairobi, Kenya have not been proven either. In fact, the Pentagon has admitted that it cannot definitely state that the suspected individuals are even in Somalia. Such speculation is obviously no basis for launching an invasion or razing two Somali villages with gunships.

Reports about the identity of those killed in the U.S. air strikes are also a matter of dispute. Independent international and pro-ICU reports both claim that the air strikes resulted in high civilian casualties, including several children. Pro-Ethiopian/U.S. reports, on the other hand, ignore reports of civilian deaths and claim the victims of the strikes were strictly limited to Al-Qaeda suspects. Another possible Bush administration motive for tying the ICU to Al-Qaeda is that some of its leaders have dared to criticize Bush's 'war on terror.'

Under the glorious but deceitful rubric of the 'global war on terror,' the Bush administration provided, through ARPCT and other channels, substantial military aid to those warlords who head clans allied with the U.S. It should be noted, however, that under the conditions of a UN-backed arms embargo (which the U.S. agreed to uphold), such aid was illegal. Finally, in December, the Ethiopian government led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (also using the amorphous claim of 'fighting terror') launched an invasion of Somalia in defense of the U.S.-backed federation government. Under specific UN resolutions, not to mention general UN principles, the invasion, the U.S. air strikes, and the current occupation are illegal.

The Ethiopian military forced the collapse of the ICU and reestablished the TFG in power. Eyewitnesses claim that they also massacred thousands in the process. Publicly, the Bush administration has given 'tacit support' to Ethiopia's actions, but clearly U.S. political, military, and financial aid to the clans, the TFG, and Ethiopia influenced provided the main impetus for the invasion. In fact, direct military assistance to Ethiopian forces in the form of shared intelligence, assistance from on-the-ground special forces 'advisors,' and the crucial role of U.S. bombing missions are the main reasons for the Ethiopian military's quick successes. In addition, at least four U.S. battleships, including an aircraft carrier, have blockaded the Gulf of Aden.

Despite ejecting the ICU from Mogadishu, fighting continues, and the ICU militias say they intend to keep up guerilla actions. Just days after military defeat of the ICU, for instance, a car bomb killed several members of President Abdullah Yusuf's family, just missing him.

What are Ethiopia's motives?

The financial and military aid Zenawi's government has garnered for aligning itself with the Bush administration 'war on terror' is a big boost for Ethiopia's business and military interests. A flood of free U.S. military supplies has strengthened Ethiopia's army and air force tremendously. Another big plus for the Zenawi government is that the war in Somalia diverts attention from the country's internal economic problems, the government’s savage repression of political opposition to its neoliberal programs, and Zenawi's failure to settle its ongoing dispute with Eritrea. The 2000 war with Eritrea and its subsequent independence disrupted Ethiopia's unfettered access to seaports, a problem that may now be resolved by the presence of a pro-Ethiopian government in Mogadishu.

U.S. interests in Somalia

The U.S. continues to seek influence in Northeast Africa and control over its newly discovered oil reserves. But extending U.S. political influence and establishing a military presence in the region may be the more important strategic goal. A powerful U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa could prove to be an important alternative to U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. Growing discontent within Saudi Arabia over the royal house's ties to the Bush administration and family are reflected in the September 2006 resignation of Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan (known as 'Bandar-Bush' by his Saudi critics), the sudden resignation of his successor, and Saudi support for the ICU in Somalia.

U.S. influence in Northeast Africa is also especially crucial, from the perspective of U.S. imperialism, in order to counter China's strong economic relationship with countries in Northeast Africa. China is believed to have sought a trade relationship with Somalia.

Also, tying the Somalia crisis to Al-Qaeda and Bush's 'war on terror' despite the lack of substantive evidence (although par for the course for this dishonest administration) serves to lend a pretense of legitimacy to U.S. involvement, by tainting Somalia with the brush of terror. Persistent confusion about what is really happening in Somalia, the Bush administration believes, will boost its standing domestically by allowing it to claim that we are still 'going after' the people who perpetrated the September 11th attacks.

What is the result?

The main result of the Ethiopian-U.S. invasion of Somalia is that there will be, at worst, civil war and that, at best, constant civil disruption will continue, preventing any kind of stability, unity, or economic development. A humanitarian crisis affecting tens of thousands of people trapped in the war zone is already occurring and will likely only get worse. (For its part, Kenya, at the request of the Bush administration, has sealed its border with Somalia, preventing refugees from seeking aid there). Both the UN and European Union have sharply criticized the air strikes as likely to provoke a deeper conflict and unlikely to enhance security in Somalia or the region. Italy, which in recent years has sought to revive investments in Somalia, has also condemned the U.S. raids.

Though the outcome may be beneficial for U.S.-based corporate interests and the political and military intrigues of the Bush administration, Somalia will be ruled by divisive clan factions under the strong influence of Washington and Addis Ababa. Economic development will be curtailed, because Bush will have veto power over Somalia's trade relationships with countries that do not have his approval (e.g. China). Washington's attitude is that the Somali people, their future and interests, do not matter as long as U.S. economic and political goals are attained. Such a situation is a mockery of the democracy, which Bush insists he is building with his endless 'war on terror.'

The Peace Movement's response

The Peace Movement should respond strongly to this situation for several reasons:

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, backed by overt U.S. air and naval support, covert intelligence, and armed advisors obliterates the basic right to self-determination of the Somali people on the slimmest of pretexts. The invasion has no legal foundation. It may have already cost thousands of lives and will likely cost thousands more.

The U.S. role in the Somalia attack points out the legal and moral flaws inherent in the Bush administration's global 'war on terror.' The claim of fighting terror can be used by any regime anywhere as cover for any policy agenda. U.S. tax dollars aid and abet the most brutal violence under the cover of fighting terror. It is a policy deployed without clear legal justification or a good public understanding of the facts. This is because much of the 'war on terror' conceals a neoconservative corporate and political agenda that has little or nothing to do with terrorism.

The permanent presence of U.S. military bases all over the world, such as the large complex in Djibouti, make this kind of illegal intervention quickly possible without much oversight by representative institutions in the U.S. or even much knowledge by the American people. According to the New York Times, Pentagon planners have called the Somalia invasion a 'model' for future actions.

The peace movement should immediately call for:

- Exposing the truth about the U.S. role in Somalia;

- Congressional oversight of the legal, moral and financial basis of the 'war on terror;'

- Public scrutiny of financial and military aid to countries claiming to fight terrorists, and

- The closure of U.S. military bases not on U.S. soil. The slogan 'bring the troops home NOW' should not only apply to Iraq.