The election in December was considered internationally an important measure in the development of Iraq's future. What were the key issues which will be influenced by the results of the election?
The elections held on 15 December marked an end of the transitional phase and were based on a constitution that had been endorsed in referendum last October. The Iraqi CP sees the elections as an important step along the path of restoring full national sovereignty in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions.
Enormous tasks will face the new parliament and the government that will be set up in the next few weeks. In addition to the legacy of occupation, there are urgent issues bearing on the day-to-day life of the people. First and foremost, are the issues of security, basic services of electricity, water and health care, unemployment, rampant corruption and economic policy. Parliament will also have to tackle issues left over from the complex constitutional drafting process.
A major issue is the withdrawal of foreign troops. Consensus was reached among all Iraqi political forces at the National Accord Conference held in Cairo last November that there should be a timetable for withdrawal that takes into account the need to rebuild Iraq's security capabilities in order to avoid further chaos and suffering. Under UN Security Council resolutions, the Iraqi government has the authority to end to the presence of 'multi-national forces'.
Considering the twin issues of occupation and terrorism hanging over Iraq, were the authorities able to organise a satisfactory electoral process?
The election campaigning was marred by fraud and intimidation. Blatant violations took place before election day on a much larger scale than during the first elections on 30 January 2005. As exposed by several NGOs and independent monitoring groups, the main perpetrators of this violence were associated with the United Iraqi Alliance, the electoral list of major Islamic Shiite forces including those dominant in the previous (and continuing) government. This was coupled with the use of religious slogans to incite people against political opponents.
Two of our party activists were murdered. On the eve of elections our main party office in Naseriyyah in the south was attacked and burnt. The mob included members of a local security force. Other secular democratic groups were also targeted.
This climate of intimidation had a negative impact on voters in several central and southern provinces, especially in Baghdad and other densely populated centres. The aim was to ensure continued dominance of groups with sectarian and authoritarian tendencies in future Iraqi politics and prevent the political programmes of competing electoral lists securing a hearing.
These tactics find fertile ground in the legacy of decades of dictatorship and also the policies of US occupation. They represent a major challenge to those who want to build a modern democratic Iraqi state. These forces cannot afford to fail because the alternative is the return of dictatorship and authoritarian rule, whether under the guise of religion or not, and deepening divisions in society along sectarian and ethnic lines. This would have disastrous consequences for the whole region. It would play into the hands of neo-conservative forces in the US whose aim is perpetuate foreign military presence as well as US political and economic influence. Voter participation in the election increased to 70% compared with 58% in the January 2005 elections and 63% in the constitutional referendum last October. This is one of the most positive aspects of the election indicating a continued trend towards greater participation in the political process. Groups that had boycotted the previous elections changed course.
The Iraqi CP participated in the election as part of a coalition of forces. What was the key uniting political position for this coalition? Who were the other key contenders for political power?
The Iraqi CP made strenuous efforts to build a broad anti-sectarian, secular and democratic electoral bloc, including left and liberal forces, based on a patriotic and democratic program. The experience of the elections in January 2005 had shown the negative impact of the relative fragmentation of the democratic camp. This attempt, despite shortcomings and certain limitations of some participating groups, was mainly aimed at breaking the sectarian-ethnic polarization currently dominating Iraqi politics.
As a result of discussions among many of these groups, especially during a National Unity Conference held in Baghdad late last year, the Iraqi National List was set up. It included 15 groups and 4 lists that had participated in the previous elections including “People’s Unity” list led by Iraqi CP.
The other major political blocs participating in the elections were the Kurdistan Alliance (the two main Kurdish parties and allies); the National Accord Front (including the Iraqi Islamic Party and two other Sunni Islamic groups), and National Council of Dialogue (nationalists, reportedly with links to former Baathists).
How did the Iraqi National List fare in the election? How do you analyse the results for the ICP?
The final results were: United Alliance 47 per cent and 128 seats; Kurdistan Alliance 19 per cent and 43 seats, National Accord front 15 per cent and 44 seats; Iraqi National List 9 per cent and 25 seats; National Dialogue Council 4 per cent and 11 seats. There are 275 seats in the Parliament.
The United Alliance, while remaining the biggest bloc, saw its share of votes drop: it gained 128 seats compared with 140 in the previous General Assembly, now less than half of the total. The Kurdistan Alliance also dropped to 53 seats as against 75.
The performance of the Iraqi National List was disproportionately affected by the violent and sectarian atmosphere. It was contesting across all provinces and, unlike the other lists, did not have a regionally based ethnic or sectarian constituency. It was also targeted as the main challenge to the United Alliance.
The representation of the Iraqi Communist Party remained the same as in the previous parliament. It has two members: the General Secretary of its Central Committe, Hamid Majeed Mousa, and Politbureau member Mufid Jaza'iry. Another member represents the Kurdistan Communist Party.
What do you think will be the outcome in terms of the shape of the executive power and the new government?
Our Party called long before the elections for the setting up of a National Unity Government as the only way to deal with the current dangerous situation. This idea has now been generally accepted by the main political players, though with different emphasis and variations. Some, like the United Alliance, called for a government based on “participation” rather than the principle of “national consensus”. This is an attempt to employ sectarian-ethnic criteria as the basis, and to marginalize the secular democratic groups, principally the Iraqi National List.
But the United Alliance is in a weaker position than it was before. It no longer commands a majority of seats. Even with support of the Kurdistan Alliance, it does not have the two-third majority needed to set up the government. A broader coalition is therefore required. The Kurdistan Alliance has indicated its desire to include the four main lists, and rejected demands to exclude the Iraqi National List. Furthermore, the call for a national unity government has now been coupled with demands for a decision making mechanism to prevent the marginalization of coalition partners.
Tough bargaining therefore lies ahead. It may take some time before a new government finally emerges.
From Nameh Mardom, central organ of the Tudeh Party Iran, 16 February 2006
--Excerpts of an interview with Salam Ali, a member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party
