3-30-06, 8:54 am
Geographically the largest country in Africa, the Sudan abuts nine sub-Saharan and north Africa countries. All their ethical and cultural diversities are reflected within its borders. As a result, the Sudan has been described as an Afro-Arab microcosm of the continent.
War, political instability, and the resurgence of obscurantist ideology are all symptoms of the present crisis in the Sudan. This crisis is a crisis of structure, a crisis of development and crisis of leadership (ruling elites whose vision of Sudan is distorted by ideas of race, religion and place of birth).
The accumulative direct outcome of the above crises is exemplified by the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime's years in power, which was the accelerated decay of the traditional village communities, mainly in the clay savanna belt (East, Blue Nile, South and Dar Fur) the tide of displaced, mainly non-Arab villagers, gave rise to unprecedented growth of the towns and appearance of very large shantytowns around the principal cities (similar to Soweto, or Mamelodi here in South Africa); and millions of refugees in the neighboring countries and around the world; it’s an apartheid system of Sudan.
There have been constant low-scale conflicts for several decades in Dar fur caused by ecological degradation and failed rains; a classic battle for resources, particularly land. Simply the state has lacked policing capacity and as a consequence, it has been common practice among all ethnic groups to arm themselves and organize self-defense mechanisms and minor clashes has occurred from time to time. However, the local traditional leaders managed to control most of those clashes. For historical record, it should be mentioned that the Umma party (1988) and NIF regime were the ones who armed some tribes to disarm others (war by proxy). In other words, to empower some as far as the land control was concerned.
Why crisis in Dar Fur now? Although the current conflict in Dar fur has historical roots, it is still necessary to find explanations as to why it started to escalate in early 2003. Was it because of the fear of being further politically and economically marginalized as a consequence of the NIF and SPLM/A peace agreement or what became known the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA)?
On the other hand, some might argue that the international alignment on the Dar fur crisis is dictated by the political economy of oil. To the extent this is true, let us not forget that oil influences China who would like continued access to Sudan's oil and the USA which covets that access. But for those who do strategic thinking about the Dar Fur conflict, the more important reason may be a political one, and that is who controls what? Bear in mind that any success or development in the South thanks to the CPA, it would give legitimacy for the other marginalized areas in the country to carry arms in order to have a better share in power as well as wealth, a situation which already took place in Eastern Sudan (low intensity conflict) and genocide in Dar fur.
In this article I would like to share some thoughts that might help address ways and means to expose these dilemmas, in the hope of building a New Sudan.
As is often expected, the task to build anything new depends upon a new vision or a new conception which implies that tomorrow can be different from today and yesterday. We cannot rely upon the same old formula, what constitutes the proper organization of a state (Sudan). We must address ourselves to new conceptions in order to realize new possibilities.
The economic dimensions of the conflict
The economic dimensions of the Dar Fur conflict are linked to the Sudan’s political and economic evolution. For example, the main line of development in the Sudan was the establishment of monetary economic relations and the increasing development of a dependent agrarian economy. This line of development was started by the Turko-Egyptian rule and vigorously continued by the British. The economic development fostered by the successive colonial regimes led directly to the establishment of a dual pattern of economic activity; namely the creation of peripheral economic relations in the center (Gezira and Khartoum) while people in the rest of the country continued to live in their old established traditional ways. This dual economic system has created the state of marginalized areas; inadequate physical infrastructure which linked the production areas to consumers areas (cities); inadequate financial infrastructure; high level of unemployment; increasing in the taxes, and uncontrollable inflation, which was severely felt in rural Dar fur and other marginalized areas in Sudan that lacked the essential services such as schools, roads, and hospitals.
Thanks to the NIF regime rule since 1989, the Sudan is now a class society. The intensified exploitation of the countryside and appearance of a class of extremely wealthy merchants and bureaucrats side by side with the disintegration of the traditional economy and the appearance of a broad sector of town poor have found expression in the ideological and political field. Someone might ask what is the role of the Sudanese intellectuals and elites? Are they contributing in this crisis? Quite obviously the answer is not the easy one. Perhaps the answer lies in the following quotation from Dr Mansour Khalid who wrote that “Sudan has lacked leadership endowed with a sense of history, intellectual integrity, and a spirit of toleration needed to ensure that the rights of one ethnic group are not purchased at the expense of another.”
The bottom line in the present Dar Fur crisis is economic deprivation. On the other hand, talking about the exploitation of the Dar fur by the center without due regard to the equally dispossessed and marginalized of some parts of Sudan (East, Blue Nile, and South) places the issue in a wrong context. Equally justifying the impoverishment of the Dar fur by saying that some parts of the Sudan are also impoverished is again placing the issue in the wrong context. Sudan’s economic plight is how to achieve equitable development in a country where the urban elite is favored against the rural populace. Therefore the whole national economy needs to be restructured to end entrenched privileges and adjust disequilibriums.
The political dimensions of the conflict From political and historical perspectives, in 1874 Dar fur was an autonomous state with strong roots in to the traditional and political state (1445-1874). After the end of the Mahdist revolution in 1898 until 1916 Dar fur was again established as an independent state. In other words, Dar fur joined Sudan after the death of sultan Ali Dinar in 1916. So what happen to this long history? Who was responsible for the disappearance of this history? Where are we now?
Dar Furians attribute the development of the modern political history of Dar fur to two political Dar Furian figures, namely Ahmed Diraige and Dr Ali Elhaj, who were regarded as the founders of the first Dar Furian political identity (the Sunni organization) after the independence.
It was thought that the new organization that the two leaders pioneered would have become a great and strong organization which would unite all Dar furians and further their political aspirations and identity. Unfortunately the two gentlemen dissolved the organization, and joined the Umma and Muslim Brothers parties. History books on Dar Fur tell us nothing substantive about the disappearance of the Sunni organization or why the leaders decided to dissolve it. However, Dar Furian elders believe that some of those early Dar Furian elites were “bought by Jalaba political leaders and parties for personal gains” and recently some are said to be “hiding in Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to reproduce NIF era in Dar fur”.
On the external front, the recent developments in Dar fur have complicated the relationship between Chad and the Sudan. The main reason for this is that Chad’s current government with President Idriss Deby is to a large extent dependent on support from the Zaghawa people whose homeland straddles the border between Dar fur and Chad. The Zaghawas are also well represented in the JEM and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) which puts pressure on Deby to sympathize with their cause. But Chad is a weak state and is dependent on support from stronger Sudan. So what are we expecting Deby to do in such a delicate situation? Bear in mind that, the NIF supports the rebels in East of Chad to overthrow the Deby government. It would seem that in such a situation the neutral role for Deby would no longer help. Given the fact that thousands of refugees have entered Chadian territory is of course something that needs political action from Deby side or he will face the music.
On the other side, Libya has had its own agenda for a long time in Dar Fur. Some claim that it is the Libyan political agitation that has led to the increased focus on the divide between Arabs and non Arabs in Dar fur (The Green land of Dar fur). The impact of these external factors in Dar Fur conflict, namely, the role of Chad and Libya, has in many ways escalated the crisis. However, we could add another potential element and that is the oil conflict between China and US in Sudan.
Dar fur reaction; the liberation philosophy
What is the philosophy of the Liberation for the Dar Furians struggle? To attempt to answer part of this question, one would argue that the possibility of secession of the South from North was to large extent the main fear of the other marginalized areas, which prompted them to take up arms, including Dar Furians. However, the majority of southern politicians and the public have never considered secession as the only and ultimate viable solution to the South-North conflict. Many knowledgeable Southern Sudanese are quite aware that the factors underlying this conflict are those of all underprivileged regions of the Sudan. It is clear that the exploitative relationship between the central region of the Sudan and the underprivileged peripheries is a situation that cannot be resolved in the benefit of all the Sudanese people through secession without risking dividing the Sudan into several tiny states, which will create more conflicts, who knows how long they might last or how many more victims?
From the manifestos of the Dar Furian movements (SLA/M, JEM) they have vindicated that they haven’t taken arms for secession from the rest of Sudan, rather, they are fighting for redistribution of power and national resources. In other words, justice should be prevailed for all the Sudanese.
As far as the conflict in Dar fur is concerned, there are a pile of questions to ask: Why are brothers, the so-called Janjaweed fighting against their brothers in Darfur? Who is benefiting from this fighting by proxy? They are all poor, without schools, roads, and hospitals.
In principle the Dar Furians should unite and confront NIF regime, and not fighting themselves by proxy to add more instability in the area. Fighting among themselves means many people will be killed, and many more will be displaced from both sides. Archbishop Desmond Tutu once said “when the white man came here, he gave us the book (Bible) and he took the lands”.
At the national level, the peripheries should organize themselves to work together for the benefit of all marginalized in the country. In this regard, the role of the post-CPA Southern Sudan in helping Dar Fur and Eastern Sudan to resolve their conflicts is an obligation that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) must carry out. There is a broad consensus that there can be no comprehensive peace in Sudan without settlement of Dar fur conflict. Then if this is the case the peripheries must unite today before tomorrow, to create what I called “United Democratic States of the New Sudan, (UDSNS)” that consists of Dar Fur + South+ East and any marginalized area that is affiliated to this ideology.
What should be done?
In the short and medium terms, I suggest multi-pronged process in the Dar fur.
First, whatever the level of civilian support enjoyed by militias, it would be a mistake to punish the communities with the sins of the particular militia they support. Instead, every effort should be made to neutralize or re-organize or disarm the militia and stabilize communities in Dar fur through local initiatives. This means both a civic conference of all communities - those identified as Arab and those as African - and reorganized civil defense forces of all communities. This may need to be done under the protective and supervisory umbrella of an African Union with full support, preferably by South African troops or United Nations policing force.
Second, priority should be to allow people to return to their homes in safety and in dignity. But this process must be entirely voluntary. The indigenous conflict-resolution mechanisms, through which tensions over resources were handled such as land and water, can also play a role in short and long term reconciliation processes.
Third, as a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence among the Dar Furians efforts should be made to support the culture of peace, of a rule of law and of a system of political accountability. It will require creating the conditions for a reorganized civil administration in Dar fur in order to engage with the people in the ground.
Fourth, of particular importance is to recognize that the international community has created an institution called the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try individuals for the most heinous crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and systematic rights abuses that prosecutions should follow. The parties to the conflict in Dar Fur are therefore reminded that the ICC has this mandate, should it becomes necessary that some of the parties to the conflict are involved in these crimes, and should come before the court whether in Pretoria or Alaska it does not matter the place.
Fifth, for the African Union, Dar fur is both an opportunity and a test. The opportunity is to build on the global concern over a humanitarian disaster in Dar fur to set a humanitarian standard that must be observed by all. And the test is to defend African sovereignty in the face of official America's global 'war on terror.' The first priority must be to stop the war and push the peace process.
Concluding observations
In order for the Sudan to progress towards a peaceful solution to the central- periphery conflict, we must bridge the rift. Some NIF political leaders should realize by now that numerical superiority of those who believe in Arabism, Islamism and the control of the country’s political and economic institutions does not necessarily give them the leverage to impose their will on the people of peripheries as the South and Dar fur conflicts have revealed. The Sudan is a pluralistic society. Peace, unity, and national prosperity can be achieved only if “Unity in diversity” is institutionalized within the framework of democratic principles.
In the final analysis, Sudanese political leaders have to make meaningful adjustments to their normative views of the future of the Sudan, and most importantly, be honest enough with themselves and the public at large to admit the need for radical, constructive changes, and then be able to expose the ugly pus very fully to the air.
-- Abu Saadia holds two Masters Degrees in developmental Management from University of Bochum, Germany and University of Western Cape, South Africa and currently resides in Pretoria – South Africa. Can be reached through
